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ARGUMENT
ISSUE I
MCLEOD'S INTERPRETATION OF §49-11-504(9) IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND IS NOT SUPERFLUOUS

Despite the glaring ambiguity that Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) (2000) presents
and the numerous attempts to show that McLeod's interpretation of §49-11-504(9) is the
correct interpretation of the statute, the Retirement Board continues to contend that the
"plain language" of §49-11-504(9) UCA "clearly" states that (McLeod's) benefit should
be calculated in two pieces based on the two service time periods. See Brief of Appellee
at 13. In their brief, the Retirement Board also contends that finding otherwise would
render the statute meaningless or superfluous. Id. The Retirement Board's interpretation
of the statute makes little sense and seems to fly in the face of the plain language of the
code. The statute states:
(9)A retiree who has returned to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires
shall have the retiree's allowance recalculated using:
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all service credit
accrued prior to that date; and
3

(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all service credit
accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates.
The plain language of the statute requires the Retirement Board to use the proper formula
to calculate retirement benefits for a retiree who has returned to employment. The
Retirement Board is quite right that McLeod does not dispute their using the proper
equation to calculate McLeod's benefit. What is in dispute is how7 that equation is to be
solved and what percentage is to be included in that equation. The Retirement Board is
emphatically incorrect when they bizarrely contend that any interpretation of §49-11504(9), other than their own, is "superfluous."
The most plausible plain reading of the statute is that if someone retires from the
system, collects retirement, returns to the system, and then retires again that the two
service periods will be calculated by two different formulas: the one "in effect at the date
of the retiree's original retirement" and the one "in effect at the date of the subsequent
retirement." This does not mean that there are two separate benefits. It simply means that
the formula used to calculate the retirement benefit will be the one in effect when the
member retires, and if they retire multiple times, the correct formula is the one in effect at
the time of each retirement. Clearly the legislature has an interest in making sure the
calculation of retirement benefits is done based on the most current formula at the time a
person retires. That is the purpose of the statute and that purpose is not meaningless or
superfluous. As this past legislative session has shown, the legislature has a substantial
interest in making sure that the formula used to calculate retirement benefits is based on

4

current economic conditions and within the budgetary guidelines of the Utah Retirement
Board.
"This Court's primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to give
effect to the Legislature's underlying intent." West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445,
446 (Utah 1982). Generally, the best indication of that intent is the statute's plain
language. "Thus, we (the Court) will interpret a statute according to its plain language,
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention if
the express purpose of the statute. West Jordan at 446.
McLeod's interpretation of the word 'formula' is, and always has been, the
equation used to calculate a retiree's benefit, which varies depending on what percentage
is used to calculate it. To conceptually understand McLeod's interpretation of the statute
and why it does not render it meaningless, it is helpful to see how McLeod's plain
reading of the statute effects his specific situation and the difference between his
understanding of the statute and URS's interpretation.
Public safety retirement benefits are calculated under a specific formula set by
statute. The formula for the first 20 years of employment is two and one-half (2 14%)
percent times 20. That number is then multiplied by the average of the top three earning
years. For every year after 20 years, until 30, it is calculated the same, except the
percentage is reduced to two percent (2%).
Utah Retirement Systems Interpretation1
1

The salary amounts used are roughly similar to McLeod's actual salary. The figures are rounded off solely to
demonstrate the differences of interpretations of the statute. See Hearing Transcript at 72:11 and 72:15 for specific
amounts.
5

When McLeod retired for the first time in 1997 his average salary was roughly
$50,000. His total term of service was also about 20 years. Again, the formula is the first
20 years of employment multiplied by two and one-half (2*/2%) percent times 20. That
number is then multiplied by the average of the top three earning years.
The formula used to calculate his retirement is: (20 x 2 lA% ) x $50,000
This equals $25,000.00 per year which is approximately what his retirement benefit was
during the two year period McLeod retired from 1996-1998.
URS then recalculates McLeod's benefit based on his next term of sendee,
completely separate from the prior years of service. He came back into the retirement
system in 1998 and retired in 2007. This would almost put his second term of service at
ten years. Again, as mentioned above, the formula used to calculate this term of service is
ten years multiplied by two percent (2%). This amount is then multiplied by the average
of the top three earning years.
Thus, the formula used, in McLeod's case, is (10 x 2%) x $85,000, equaling $17,500.
Those two amounts ($25,000 + $17,500) are then added together to reach the entire
allowed benefit ($42,500).
McLeod's Interpretation
McLeod's interpretation is much simpler, and much more in line with the wording
of the statute. The equation is exactly the same. The first 20 years of employment
multiplied by two and one-half (2Vi%) percent. That number is then multiplied by the
average of the top three earning years. All subsequent years are calculated at two percent
(2%).
6

Therefore, for the service period of 1976-1996 McLeod's retirement is calculated
using the two and one half percent equation. When McLeod re-entered the system in
1998 his retirement was then calculated using the two percent equation. Thus, McLeod
retirement benefit ought to be calculated:
20 (years) multiplied by 2 l/2% which is 50%
10 (years) multiplied by 2% which is 15%.
These two percentages added together is 65%. 65% is then multiplied by his highest three
years of salary ($85,000) to get a total benefit of $59,500. McLeod's interpretation of the
statute is clearly in accordance with the plain language of the statute.
The Retirement Board further contends that "if you pay into a system for a few
years, then begin drawing benefits from that system for a time without putting any
additional money in, you will have less money (all other things being equal) than an
individual who puts the same amount of money in an account, but does not draw on that
money in the first place." Brief of Appellee at 18. This argument is nonsensical. Kevin
McLeod worked for 28+ years in law enforcement before he started to collect his final
retirement in 2007. He contributed exactly the same amount to his retirement benefit as
anyone else that worked the same amount of time. McLeod5s entire objective in pursuing
this case is that he be treated the same as anyone else that has worked his same amount of
time. It is true that McLeod retired for roughly two years, from December of 1996 to
January of 1999 and received his initial retirement benefit. Subsequently, he also lost two
years toward the necessary thirty years to receive the maximum benefit. In order to get
the maximum amount of benefits afforded to a peace officer, he would have to be
7

employed by a law enforcement agency for thirty7 years (in order to reach the maximum
retirement allowed under U.C.A. §49-14-402(2)(a)). As mentioned above, in law
enforcement, the formula for the first 20 years of employment is two and one-half (2
l

A%) percent times 20. That number is then multiplied by the average of the top three

earning years. For every year after 20 years, until 30, it is calculated the same, except the
percentage is reduced to two percent (2%). After 30 years of employment, law
enforcement officers do not accrue additional retirement benefits. Therefore it makes
sense to only remain employed for thirty years (even with gaps in terms of service)
before an officer finally retires and begins to collect retirement. Because McLeod retired
for two years from December 1996 to January 1999. he lost two years toward his thirty
required years of service necessary for a maximum retirement benefit. He had to work
an additional two years (from 2005-2007) to accrue the service years toward his
maximum benefit. In those additional two years, he more than gave up in the amount he
received in benefits those two years between his terms of service. He contributed to the
system just as much as anyone else with his similar terms of service. All he asks is that he
be treated the same as anyone else who has worked the same amount of time that he has.
The Retirement Board's brief states that "Mr. McLeod's benefit that he received
between December 1996 and January 1999 is worth $139,407.20 in today's dollars" and
that "if Mr. McLeod is allowed to calculate his benefit as he desires, he will receive an
approximate $140,000 windfall which he did not earn." See Appellee's Brief at 18. As
mentioned above, during McLeod's first retirement period he received roughly $50,000
2

McLeod served 28 years
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in his retirement benefit. The Retirement Board attaches ten percent (10%) interest to the
received benefit and then arrives at $140,000. There is no deposit or savings account in
the country that is returning ten percent in interest on a deposit. The fact that the
Retirement Board imputes received benefits at ten percent interest seems to demonstrate
their lack of good faith in calculating retirement benefits and in administering the various
retirement systems to public employees. At best, McLeod's $50,000 benefit should be
imputed with a three or four percent interest rate. Furthermore, as stated above, that
amount is more than offset by having to work two additional years before receiving
benefits.
Finally, the Retirement Board incorrectly states McLeod's interpretation of §4911-504(9). Appellee's Brief states "He claims that 49-11-504(9) should be interpreted to
mean that a post-retirement benefit will only be calculated in two pieces if the legislature
happened to change the retirement formula between the first and second retirement
dates." See Brief of Appellee at 19. McLeod never contended that retirement benefits
need be calculated in two pieces, at least as far as this statute is concerned. In fact,
Appellant's Brief clearly states "...to bifurcate the two terms of service is certainly not
justified by the statute, and in fact, seems to be contrary to the clear language of the
statute." See Brief of Appellant at 41. Again, the Retirement Board fails to grasp
McLeod's interpretation and what seems to be the plain language of the statute. The
statute does not mandate two periods of service for a retiree who has returned to work
after retirement and starts to accrue additional service credit. If the Legislature meant two
bifurcated time periods, then they would have so stated. All the statute says is that the
9

formula that is in effect at the date of the retiree's original and subsequent retirement
dates will be added together to reach the proper percentage to calculate the final
retirement benefit.
ISSUE II
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS MCLEOD'S INTERPRETATION OF U.C.A. 4911-504(9)
In an attempt to bolster their claim that URS properly interpreted the statute in
issue here, URS mentioned several provisions in Title 49 to show that public policy
considerations support their position. See Brief of Appellee at 17-18. Even if the Court
does find ambiguity in the statute, public policy considerations support McLeod's
interpretation of the statute. When faced with a question of statutory construction, Utah
Courts first look first to the plain language of the statute. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,
814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989)
(per curiam). "Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek
guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations." Schurtz, 814
P.2d at 1112; Bonham, 788 P.2d at 500.
Retirement benefits of state employees were among the most "hot button" issues
addressed in the 2010 legislative session. The formula, or equation, used to calculate
retirement benefits was among the forefront of legislative issues. Senator Dan Liljenquist
sponsored a number of bills aimed at fixing the entire system of public pensions. The rate
of contribution for the public safety retirement system was changed during the 2010
legislature session. This change directly effects the statute in controversy in the case at
bar and demonstrates the purpose of the Legislature in passing this statute in the first
10

place. This past session the legislature completely revamped the public safety
contribution plan, and changed the calculation of retirement benefits from 2.5% of the top
three years of salary to 1.5% of the top five years5 salary. See U.C.A. §49-23304(2)(a)(2010). During the debate of Senate Bill 63 (the bill now codified as §49-23304), Senator Lilenquist stated that the purpose behind these bills was to "ensure that we
can meet 100% of our pension obligations. To do that, we have to reduce the risk that our
current system is bearing." The new law passed by the legislature and signed by
Governor Herbert on March 29, 2010 reduces the contribution rate by the State of Utah to
public safety retirees in order to pay off losses incurred by the Utah State Retirement
Board during the 2008 financial crisis. As mentioned above the new law lowers the
yearly contribution percentage from 2.5% to 1.5%. It also changed the formula in that it
increased the number of years to calculate a retiree's average salary. Previously, as
mentioned above, the formula to calculate retirement benefits is, for the first 20 years of
employment, two and one-half (2 ¥2%) percent times 20. That number is then multiplied
by the average of the top three earning years. For every year after 20 years, until 30, it is
calculated the same, except the percentage is reduced to two percent (2%). SB 63
increased the average of the top three earning years to five years. Therefore, as a result of
SB 63, the formula will be, for the first 20 years of employment, one and one-half (1
l

A%) percent times 20. That number is then multiplied by the average of the top five

earning years. There is no longer a 30 year stop date for accruing retirement benefits. The

3

See Senate Debate: SB 0063S01 at 12:01
<http://le.utah.gov/jsp/jdisplay^
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period is indefinite. This new formula will significantly decrease the retirement benefit
for a law enforcement retiree after 2011.
The point of the changes instituted by this, and other retirement reforms, is as
Senator Liljenquist mentioned, to make sure that the State can meet its financial
obligations and to maintain the soundness of the various retirement systems. The
"formula" mentioned in U.C.A. §49-11-504(9) is directly affected by the changes made
to the public safety retirement system in the 2010 legislature. The formula was changed
from a 2.5%) multiplier to a 1.5% multiplier, and the number of years used to calculate the
average annual salary was increased from three to five years. This was all done in order
to maintain the actuarial soundness of the system. For example, if a peace officer from a
hypothetical Utah city police department retired in 2005 and started to collect retirement,
his/her retirement would be calculated using the current 2.5%) multiplier. If he/she then
decides to return to that police department after July 2011 (the effective date of §49-23304,) her benefit will be canceled and all service accrued after returning to work will be
calculated using the new 1.5% multiplier. When this officer decides to retire again,
his/her retirement should be calculated using the 2.5%) multiplier for all service accrued
before 2005 and the 1.5% multiplier for all service accrued during her second term of
service all multiplied by the average of the top five earning years, at least according the
plain language of §49-11-504(9). Public policy dictates that the legislature has a direct
interest in changing or altering the formula used to calculate retirement benefits. That is
the purpose behind the statute at issue here.

12

The Legislature defined the purpose of Utah Retirement Board in Utah Code Ann.
§49-11-103, as outlined in the Appellee's Brief on page 17. Subsection 2 states "This title
shall be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and protections consistent with
sound fiduciary and actuarial principles." Not only does this subsection mandate that
Title 49 be construed liberally in favor of state employees who are members of the
systems, but it also indicates that the Retirement Board has fiduciary duties toward state
employees that are members of their retirement systems and to current retirees. Blacks
Law Dictionary describes a fiduciary as "a person who is required to act for the benefit of
another person on all matters within the scope of their relationship; one who owes to
another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor." It further describes a
fiduciary as "one who must exercise a high standard of care in managing another's money
or property" Blacks Law Dictionary, 8 Edition 2004. As a fiduciary, URS had a
heightened duty to be honest and exercise a high standard of care toward Kevin McLeod.
They had a duty to inform him how they were going to calculate his retirement benefit
and how decisions he made would impact that benefit. They especially had a duty to
calculate his benefit properly and in accordance with statutory guidelines. Furthermore,
as a fiduciary, it seems that URS ought to have a duty to keep track of members' phone
calls. This could have been done by recording or by taking notes about what was said and
noting which employee took the call, as is the practice with current system members. It
seems that an agency that has a fiduciary duty to their members should be doing all of
these things.

13

The purpose of Title 49 is more than met by McLeod's interpretation of §49-11504(9). Recent legislative history and actions taken by the legislature in reforming and
creating new retirement systems for state employees indicate that an important concern of
the legislature is protecting the financial soundness of the State. The intent of the
legislature can be inferred by the plain language of §49-11-504(9) coupled with their
recent actions to protect the financial soundness of the system.

ISSUE III
THE RETIREMENT BOARD IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM DENYING
MCLEOD THE PROPER CALCULATION OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFIT
The Retirement Board continues to contend that McLeod has failed to prove that
URS made a statement inconsistent with a claim later asserted to which he relied upon to
his detriment, despite the clear evidence provided by McLeod in the hearing and in
Appellant's Brief.
As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of estoppel may not be asserted
against the state and its agencies. Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718
(Utah 1982). Nevertheless, Utah courts have carved out an exception to this general
common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is plain that the interests of justice
so require." Id. at 720; see, e.g., Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comrn'n,
602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). "In cases where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is
whether it appears that the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Utah State Univ., 646 P.2d at
720. Clearly, the finding of equitable estoppel against a government agency is a factual
14

inquiry and McLeod produced more than enough facts to satisfy a claim for equitable
estoppel.
The elements essential to invoke equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement,
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would
result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act. Holland v. Career Service Review Bd. 856 P. 2d 678, 682 (Utah App.
1993).
A.

McLeod Provided Enough Evidence at the Hearing to Prove that
URS Made a Statement to Him Which Was Later Repudiated.

URS made a series of statements to McLeod that they later repudiated. It is clear
that much of the information McLeod received from URS was received orally over a
series of telephone calls. McLeod testified at the Hearing that he made over three phone
calls to URS asking specific questions about his situation. See T. 15:9-25; 19:6-13; 25:28. Neither URS, nor McLeod, took notes of these phone calls. Nevertheless, the
statements can be inferred by the actions McLeod took in reliance upon them.
i.

McLeod properly marshaled the evidence to challenge the Hearing
Officer's finding that URS never made a statement to McLeod.
URS argues that "Mr. McLeod failed to properly marshal the evidence to correctly

challenge the Hearing Officer's finding that URS never made a statement to Mr. McLeod
which it later repudiated." In support of their argument, URS cited Friends of Maple
Mountain, Inc. v. Mapleton City, 2010 UT 11,ffiflO,12, 228 P.3d 1242. It reads:
15

A recital of the trial court's findings with which the appellant disagrees does not
amount to marshaling. Rather, the appellant must educate the court as to exactly
how the trial court arrived at each of the challenged findings. This requires "a
precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings," correlated
to the location of that evidence in the record. Failure to provide this summary
amounts to an invitation to the appellate court to invest its time and resources to
"go behind the trial court's factual findings" itself; an invitation which the
appellate court may, in its discretion, refuse. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^[77,
100 P.3d 1177.
Therefore, appellants must first "present the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their
case." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006
UT 35, % 26, 140 P.3d 1200 (internal quotation marks omitted). Then, appellants
must "explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id.
Appellant's Brief clearly outlined the evidence produced at the hearing and explained
why the Hearing Officer's application of the law to those facts was erroneous.
Appellant's Brief outlined, and directly cited to, the facts as they were laid out in the
hearing. In its brief, Appellant outlined that he had never received written confirmation of
his conversations with URS. See Appellant's Brief at 17. He also outlined that he did not
take notes of the phone calls he made. Id. These two facts were the primary reason why
the Hearing Officer ruled that he could not find certainty that URS made any statement at
all to McLeod about his retirement situation. The Memorandum Decision reads:
In the instant case, there was no written communications from URS to the
Petitioner before he retired. He relies on two telephone calls made to URS which
were unfortunately not recorded in any manner by either URS or Petitioner. We
have only his account of what questions he asked and what responses he
received. We do not know who he talked to (name or position). A relatively brief
telephone call may not always be adequate to explain an unusual fact or situation
with enough detail to obtain an accurate answer. I have no doubt that the Petitioner
came away from those calls with the understanding that he could retire, draw
retirement, return in two years to the same office, retire later a second time and
have his retirement benefit calculated on the basis of one period of employment.

16

But I cannot find that he was actually told that in either call. See
Memorandum Decision at Page 2.
McLeod fully satisfied the burden established by the Utah Supreme Court when it
said that appellants must "present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court
and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case." United Park
City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ]f 26, 140 P.3d
1200. It certainly doesn't help Appellant's case that McLeod never received written
communications from URS. In fact, as outlined above, the Hearing Officer used those
particular facts to rule against the Petitioner at the hearing. Appellee's Brief further
maintains that "McLeod failed to provide a 'precisely focused summary' of the evidence
in the 'light most favorable' to the Hearing Officer's findings and failed to show any fatal
flaws in the Hearing Officer's findings." See Appellee's Brief at 25. McLeod disagrees.
All of the relevant evidence that the Hearing Officer used to arrive at his decision was
included in the Appellant's Brief. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) state
that "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." The Utah Supreme Court clarified the Rules that "to
successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party 'must marshall [sic] all of
the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.'" Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm% 116 P.2d
63,68(UtahCt.App.l989).
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McLeod fully satisfied the marshaling requirement of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. All relevant evidence that the Hearing Officer, and thus the Board,
used to arrive at their Findings of Fact was included, and cited to, in Appellant's Brief.
Facts such as no written representations, no recording of phone calls, and no taking of
notes during the alleged phone calls, which go to the heart of the decision by the Board to
deny McLeod's petition, are properly included and "precisely summarized" in
Appellant's Statement of Facts. See Brief of Appellant at 17. After outlining the facts, the
Appellant attacked the reasoning of the Hearing Officer and "ferret(ed) out a fatal flaw in
the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
Ct.App.1991) and argued why the Hearing Officer's application of the law to those facts
was erroneous and asks this Court to review them for "clear error." Housekeeper v. State,
2008 UT 78, fl8, 197 P.3d 636. McLeod is not asking this Court to retry the facts. Quite
the contrary, McLeod is asking the court to review all relevant facts marshaled by the
Appellant and to overrule the decision of the Hearing Officer and estopp the Utah
Retirement Board from abrogating the promises made to McLeod in 1996.
ii.

The Hearing Record shows that URS made numerous statements to
McLeod, which they later repudiated.
Despite never requesting or receiving written declarations from the Retirement

Office that his retirement would be calculated using one continuous period, the facts
demonstrate that URS did in fact make statements to McLeod that it later repudiated.
Claims for equitable estoppel "presents a mixed question, which 'involves the
application of law to fact." Terry v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT App 87, % 8, 157 P.3d 797
18

(quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 33 n. 12, 70 P.3d 111.) The court reviews the
underlying facts for clear error and the application of the law to those facts for
correctness. See Id.
URS recites portions of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact in an effort to prove
that URS has no record of telephone calls between McLeod and URS in 1996. See Brief
of Appellee at 28. Clearly neither side has physical documents proving the substance of
these phone calls. Also, it is important to note that Utah courts have never held that there
must be written representations to prevail on an estoppel claim against a government
entity. Presumably, since it has never held as such, oral declarations can be used as
evidence of an estoppel claim. McLeod emphatically renews his assertion that he called
URS on three separate occasions between 1996-1999 and was told that his retirement
would be calculated as one continuous term of service, and not two bifurcated terms.
Both times he made contact with URS in 1996 the operator indicated that his service
would be calculated as one continuous term.
McLeod also received statements from Utah Retirement Systems that showed his
benefit calculated as one continuous period. Although he received these statements after
he retired from the Davis County Sherriff s Office, it further demonstrates and adds
credibility to his claims that he was told his retirement would be calculated as one
continuous period, not two as the Retirement Board is now claiming. These statements
are not ambiguous. The statements plainly show one continuous term of service from the
time McLeod began working at the Bountiful Police Department in 1976 to when he
finally retired from the Davis County Sherriff s Office in 2007. These statements, albeit
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received after McLeod first retired in 1996, add a lot of weight to McLeod's claim that he
received information from the Retirement Board that his retirement benefit would be
based on one period of service. Furthermore, these statements are prepared by URS
employees and it is presumable, probably likely, that URS employees would look at these
statements and assume that retirement benefits are calculated as one continuous timeperiod. These statements clearly denote one time period as the basis for calculating
retirement benefits for a retiree who has returned to work. It is highly likely that an
employee, looking at these statements, would conclude that the time of service would be
calculated as one continuous benefit.
Because of the assured attitude of the retirement officer that he talked to, McLeod
left the Davis County Sheriffs Office with a high level of comfort that his retirement
would not be adversely affected. Unfortunately, we do not know who he talked to in the
office. URS continues to maintain that all calls regarding post retirement would have
been answered by Judy Lund: "Any phone calls regarding post-retirement retirement
calculation questions, like the ones Mr. McLeod alleged he asked, would have been
transferred to her." See Brief of Appellee at 29. This assertion is directly contradicted by
Ms. Lund herself when she testified that phone calls generally first go to the Customer
Service Department and then to someone who can properly answer the question.
Presumably, questions about post retirement benefits would have gone to her, if she were
available to take the call. However, if Ms. Lund was unavailable backs-ups or specialists
in other areas attempted to answer the questions. See Appellant's Brief at 20 or the
Hearing Transcript 153:3-7; 154: 8-21. It is not difficult to realize that Ms. Lund was not
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available 100% of the time to answer questions. Due to the number of employees in the
office and the large amount of turnover in the past 13 years we will probably never know
who McLeod talked to. It is also entirely possible that the person he talked to no longer
remember the conversation, is not willing to divulge exactly what was said, or no longer
works forURS.
Nevertheless, we can be assured that those comments were made, not only because
of McLeod5 s recollection, but also because he immediately, after having those two
conversations with the Retirement Office, talked in detail with Sheriff Cox and with his
wife, Diane McLeod. He relayed to both of them exactly what he was told: that upon his
return to work his retirement would not be adversely affected except that he would lose
the two years of service when he was gone, and that the benefit would be canceled until
he finally retired. By his actions and the testimony of people surrounding him at the time,
confirmed by the statements he received in the mail, the first three prongs of estoppel are
met: a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the
first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act. Holland at 682. The third prong
"injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act" is met when the Board denied
all of McLeod 5s direct appeals.
iii.

The oral statements URS made to McLeod are not hearsay under the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
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The Retirement Board asserts that the Hearing Officer "could not make a finding
that URS made an oral disputed statement to Mr. McLeod which it later repudiated
because such a finding of fact would be based solely on inadmissible hearsay "Brief of
Appellee at 31 The Board has failed to properly describe and apply the hearsay rule. The
hearsay rule does not ban all out of court statements being admitted into evidence; only
that it not be offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c)
defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. If an out
of court statement is introduced for any purpose other than to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, there is no need to cross examine the declarant; so the statement is not
hearsay. Specifically, statements offered to show their effect on the hearer and statements
offered as circumstantial evidence of declarant's state of mind are not covered under the
hearsay rule. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "when an out-of-court statement is
offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it is true, such
testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay rule." State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 337
(Utah 1980) McLeod is not offering the oral statements made by URS to him for the truth
of the matter asserted but in order to show the motive behind his decision to retire and in
an effort to explain why he took the actions he did. Because the oral statements are not
hearsay, they are admissible and available to be used as a basis for a finding of fact in an
administrative hearing. Again, the Board misunderstands the hearsay rule when they state
"If Mr. McLeod claims that his testimony is not necessarily true regarding the
conversations with URS, he once again has no evidence for the substance of these
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conversations." It makes no difference whether or not the information McLeod received
from URS was true or not. A URS employee told McLeod that his retirement would be
calculated as one continuous period, not bifurcated based on two separate terms of
service. McLeod relied on those statements when he made the decision to retire. It
matters not that the information given to him was true. The mere fact that the statements
were made is what is at issue. Because the statements were offered to show why McLeod
made the retirement decisions that he did, and not for the actual truth of those statements,
they are not covered under the Hearsay Rule and may be used as the sole basis for a
ruling by an administrative law judge.
The Hearing Officer erred when he ruled that McLeod did not meet all of the
elements of estoppel. Kevin McLeod would have received his full retirement benefit if
accurate advice had been given to him. He would have either not retired when he left for
the two years, not left at all, waited another year to return until the law changed and
allowed him to place his future retirement in a retirement fund 401(k) and collect his
retirement during the full term that he served as Chief Deputy at the Davis County
Sheriffs Office. The year after McLeod first retired in 1996 the law was changed so that
members could opt to have their retirement placed in a 401(k) retirement plan. Ever since
then, retiree's who are temporarily retiring, either to take a job in the private sector (like
McLeod did) or for any other purpose, can place their retirement into a 401(k). If
McLeod would have had that option available to him, he may have taken it. All of these
options would have allowed him to receive the full benefit of his retirement. The only
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limited area where the Retirement Office has taken the position that he cannot receive his
retirement is to do exactly what he did, based on their advice.
CONCLUSION
The Retirement Board did not interpret Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) accurately.
A proper interpretation of the statute is that the formula that is in effect at the date of the
retiree's original and subsequent retirement dates will be added together to reach the
proper percentage to calculate the final retirement benefit. The Retirement Board is
reading language into the statute that is not there: that the terms of service are bifurcated
and added together rather than one continuous fluid period.
Additionally, McLeod has shown that Hearing Officer erred when it determined
that he had not met all of the elements required to invoke estoppel against the Utah
Retirement Board. URS made statements to McLeod in a series of phone calls from
1996-1999. They then repudiated those statements when McLeod called for a fourth time
to clarify what had be previously told to him in 2001, after McLeod had relied on their
information. McLeod will lose hundreds of thousands of dollars over his lifetime because
of the mistake of the Retirement Board. This is more than enough to satisfy the standards
of equitable estoppel against URS. This grave injustice cannot be allowed to stand and
the Court ought to invoke estoppel against the Utah Retirement Board.
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